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I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO)'s ultimate purpose in
the international trade regime is to level the frontiers among the
trade partner countries by removing trade barriers in order to
I Professor of International Trade Law, Pusan National University, Pusan 609735, Korea. The original version of this paper, Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade
Barriers used by Korea and Japan: Focusing on Service and Investment Markets, was
published in 16 BOND L. REV. 117, 117-65 (2004). This paper has been modified
according to the changes of the trade regulations and measures made by the Korean and
Japanese governments during the past three years. This work was supported by Pusan
National University Research Grant. The author wishes to thank Article Editor Ahmad
Elkhouly and research assistant Ju Young Lee for their invaluable support and laborious
efforts made for this paper.
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secure fair and free opportunities of competition for the member
countries.' Unfair and anti-competitive practices in domestic
markets 2 can provide a further means of protection in addition to
I Pmbl., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2 Unfair and anti-competitive practices in the domestic markets, in general, would
be read as "unreasonable" acts, policies, or practices under the Trade Act of 1974
Section 301(d). The Act defines "unreasonable" to include the following:
(3) (A) An Act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice,
while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal
rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable.
(B) Acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable include, but are not
limited to any, act, policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies,
or practices, which(i) denies fair and equitable(I) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise,
(II) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country
may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights referred to in section 3511 (d) of this title,
(III) nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United
States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, or
(IV) market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign
government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises
or among enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of
restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial
considerations, access of United States goods or services to a
foreign market,
(ii) constitutes export targeting, or
(iii) constitutes a persistent pattern of conduct that(I) denies workers the right of association,
(II) denies workers the right to organize and bargain collectively,
(III) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
(IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of
children, or
(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work,
and occupational safety and health of workers.
19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(1) (2000). For more information regarding Section 301, see Frank
J. Schweitzer, Flash of The Titans: A Picture of Section 301 in The Dispute between
Kodak and Fuji and a View toward Dismantling Anticompetitive Practices in the
Japanese Distribution System, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 847, 852 n.36 (1996)
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removing frontier barriers.' These anti-competitive practices have
been regarded as more important in the service4 and investment5
markets than in commodity 6 markets due to their competition
distorting effects.7

As the multilateral negotiations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)IWTO system have reduced the
major frontier barriers to international trade, there has been an
increasing worldwide interest in anti-competitive practices as trade
barriers in domestic markets, particularly in the service and
investment markets. 8 With relation to these practices, Korea and
Japan have traditionally been targets of criticism from countries

(citing The Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)).
3 See Catherine Smith, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is There Still a
Place for the World Trade Organization?, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 321, 332-33
(2006) (discussing trade policy and competitive policy).
4 Services, herewith, covers all internationally-traded services including
telecommunications, tourism, professional services, transportation, advertising,
engineering, construction and computer services.
See ROBERT J. CARBAUGH,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 141-43 (1985); WTO, Understanding the WTO: The
Agreements, Services: Rules for Growth and Investment, http://www.wto.org/
English/thewto e/whatise/tife/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
5 Investment, herewith, means "expenditure to acquire property or assets to
produce revenue" such as a capital outlay. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 844 (Deluxe 8th
ed. 2004). Investment can be divided into Direct Investment that is invested directly in
production in another country, either by buying a company there or establishing new
operations of an existing business, and Indirect Investment such as buying small parcels
of a country's supply of financial products. See Frank Franciosa, International Capital
Mobility: Examining the Casefor Liberalized Investment as a Mechanismfor Improving
Developing Country, 17 WINDSOR REv. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 83, 88 n. 12 (2004).
6 Commodity, herewith, "embraces only tangible goods, such as products or
merchandise, as distinguished from services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (8th ed.
2004). Commodity can also be defined as "[a]n economic good, especially a raw
material or an agricultural product."Id See United States Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service, WTO: Commodity Market Issues in the WTO, availableat
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/wto/commodities.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (for
coverage under the WTO Agreement).
7 See Kevin C. Kennedy, ForeignDirect Investment and Competition Policy at the
World Trade Organization,33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 585, 585-86 (2001).
8 See Jason E. Kearns, International Competition Policy and the GATS: A
Proposal to Address Market Access Limitations in the Distribution Services Sector, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. 285, 297 (2001) ("[T]hrough the GATS framework, [m]embers...
have agreed to maintain appropriate measures to prevent suppliers ... from engaging in
anti-competitive practices.").
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that are affected by their trade practices. 9 This is in part due to
Korean and Japanese manipulation of anti-competitive practices to
protect
their
domestic
markets,
particularly
their
service/investment markets.
It is also due to the fact that
restrictive competitive practices have not been properly regulated
according to their respective trade volume and market size.' °
This paper compares the anti-competitive practices used by
Korea and Japan through the interpretation of anti-competitive
practices under the WTO. This interpretation is generally and
implicitly affected by international competition norms which have
been discussed multilaterally. This comparative study explores
the differences in regulating the anti-competitive practices of
Korea and Japan, and suggests the coordination and establishment
of common rules to regulate the practices of the two countries in
the service and investment markets.
This paper also analyzes the effect of anti-competitive
practices on international trade and the criticism of Korea and
Japan because of these practices. For purposes of this study, the
term anti-competitive practices includes private restrictive
business practices and governmental regulations of such practices,
which hamper the flow of trade and fair competition and have
been regarded as trade barriers."
II. International Regulations
A. Anti-competitive Practicesas Trade Barriers
Among the multiple international approaches to regulating
unfair and anti-competitive practices as trade barriers, one
approach is to reconcile the conflicts between trade and
competition policy.' 2 Here, the term "trade barrier" will mean any
9 For example, Japanese and Korean policies and practices related to market
access have usually been discussed in the annual National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers. For more detailed information on this report, see Frederick M.
Abbott, Changing the Dynamic of Dispute Settlement and Avoidance in Trade Relations
Between Japanand the United States, 16 ARtZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 190 (1999).
10 See id.

11 See generally Schweitzer, supra note 2, at 849-75 (discussing the hampering
effect of anti-competitive practices on the flow of trade and fair competition through a
focus on Japanese unfair trade practices).
12 See, e.g., Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of
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kind of entry barrier to the domestic market which impedes the
complete national treatment.13
As illustrated through multinational discussions on trade and
competition policies, 4 trade barriers of importing countries are a
matter of competition policy. 5 Trade barriers can also be assumed
to be a matter of trade policy from the viewpoint of the exporting
country.' 6 In principle, the basic purpose of both trade and
competition policies is the improvement of economic efficiency
and consumer welfare. 17 Enforcement of the two policies, can
create conflicts can when policies with conflicting priorities are
imposed.' 8 International concerns, particularly under the WTO
framework, have recently been concentrated on the competition
policy effects on trade policy.19
The main purpose of international discussions on the effect of
competition policy on international trade-specifically on the use
of anti-competitive practices as trade barriers 2° -has been to
reduce the disparity among markets of individual countries and to
secure fair and free access to domestic markets 21 under the
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 736
(1999) (discussing the relationship between trade laws and competition laws under
GATFrWTO).
13 See Christine N. Schnarr, Left out in the Cold?: The Customs' Country of Origin
Marking Requirements, the Section 516 Procedure,and the Lessons of Norcal/Crosetti,

73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679, 1685 (1995) "[T]he marking statute creates a two-part trade
barrier: [ffirst, the statutory marking requirement acts as an 'entry barrier[,]' [s]econd,
the mark itself serves as a 'sales bar-ier' in the market place." Id.
14 See Smith, supra note 3, at 332-34.
15 See id. at 332-33.
16 See Kyle Bagwell et al., The Boundariesof the WTO: It's a Question of Market

Access, 96 AM. J. INT'LL. 56, 67 (2002).
17 Kennedy, supra note 7, at 587.
18 For the potential conflicts between the trade laws and the competition laws in the
United States, see William H. Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute
Resolution: Lessons Learnedfrom the U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv.

459, 462-63 (1998).
19 See Michael K. Young, Lessons from the Battle Front: U.S.-Japan Trade Wars
and Their Impact on the MultilateralTrading System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 753,

756 (2001).
20 For the difficulty in evaluating the anti-competitive business practices as
impediments to market access, see Barringer, supra note 18, at 477.
21 See Mitsuo Matsushita, United States-Japan Trade Issues and a Possible
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precondition that trade barriers between frontiers should be
eliminated completely. 22 Thus, anti-competitive practices have
been regarded as trade barriers, which, if not regulated
appropriately, could interrupt access to the domestic
markets of
23
imported goods and services for foreign exporters.
Since the Havana Charter of the International Trade
Organization (Havana Charter) in 1948 failed to establish an
international rule regulating restrictive business practices,
multilateral and plurilateral efforts have been unsuccessful in
regulating anti-competitive business practices.24 While those
attempts 25 have failed, 26 the issue of anti-competitive practices has
been raised in recent years in other GATT/WTO contexts, 27 and

BilateralAntitrust Agreement Between the United States and Japan, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 249, 250 (1999).
22 For a discussion of a potential agreement on competition policy, see Kennedy,
supra note 7, at 586.
23 For the most visible and well-documented instance of these restrictive business
practices affecting trade, see Barringer, supra note 18, at 460. For the difficulty in
addressing the anti-competitive practices through the WTO mechanism, see James D.
Southwick, Addressing Market Access Barriersin Japan Through the WTO: A Survey of
Typical Japan Market Access Issues and the Possibilityto Address Them Through WTO
Dispute Resolution Procedures,31 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 923, 925 (2000).
24 For important gaps in the WTO rule system, that is, the absence of minimum
rules on the maintenance of competitive domestic markets, see Abbott, supra note 9, at
185. For the complexity of the international agreements on competition policy, see
Kearns, supra note 8, at 288-90. Some multilateral and plurilateral efforts have included
the International Trade Organization's (ITO) plan to regulate restrictive business
practices in 1948, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
guidelines for multinational enterprises in 1976, various attempts by the United Nations
to regulate restrictive practices in 1979 and 1980, and a draft of the international antitrust
code in 1993. See JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995) 1090, 1090-1102.
25 See Matsushita, supra note 21, at 251 (explaining that, in addition to the above
international attempts, there have been bilateral attempts to regulate anti-competitive
practices, which, currently may be the only possible form of agreement).
26 See Southwick, supra note 23, at 963-64 (stating that attempts to treat anticompetitive practices and market structures, for example, in Japan, through GATT/WTO
mechanisms have been completely unsuccessful).
27 See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996,
W'T/MIN(96)/DEC (1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/
min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); WTO, The Doha Declaration
Explained, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/dohaexplainede.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2007). For at least three WTO agreements speaking directly to the issue of
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there has been a general consensus that the interface between trade
and competition policies has become more important.28
Besides the international efforts to address this matter,29 many
developed countries have regulated various kinds of anticompetitive practices through expanding and applying the concept
of fair trade provided in international or individual domestic trade
laws, along with the extraterritorial application of their domestic
competition laws3" or positive comity.3 For example, according to
Section 301(d) of the Trade Act of 1974,32 government toleration
of private and systematic anti-competitive activities that
effectively restrict access to foreign markets may be regarded as
"unreasonable" acts.33 The concept of reasonable or fair trade
practice, which exceeds the scope of the tariff or non-tariff barriers
at the frontiers, has become a widely accepted basis of securing

restrictive business practices, see Kearns, supra note 8, at 294.
28 For discussions about the WTO Agreement on Competition designed to deal
with anti-competitive practices, see Jean-Francois Bellis, Anti-competitive Practicesand
the WTO: The Elusive Search for New World Trade Rules, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 361, 365-366

(2000) (citing Brian Hindley, Competition Law and the WTO: Alternative Structuresfor
Agreement, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE

(1996)). For some factors triggering this consensus, see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 587.
29 For the lack of clarity of the current WTO System in treating trade disputes
involving anti-competitive practices, see Abbott, supra note 9, at 185; see also Kearns,
supra note 8, at 297.
30 For cases relating to extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, see
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 1078-89; Merit E. Janow, Public, Private and Hybrid
Public/PrivateRestraints of Trade: What Role for the WTO?, 31 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
977, 978-79 (2000).
31 See Janow, supra note 30, at 979 (discussing the use of positive comity to
substitute the extraterritorial application of the domestic anti-trust laws).
32 For the aggressive results-oriented approach under Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, see Barringer, supra note 18, at 460; Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial
Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 33, 46 (1996) (citing Wolfgang W.
Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A
Comparisonof Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1972 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 41, 41 (1994)). Regarding the negative effect of the WTO
mechanism leading the United States to rely on unilateral measures under Section 301,
see Alan W. Wolff, America's Ability to Achieve Its Commercial Objectives and the
Operation of the WTO, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1013, 1027 (2000).
33 RALPH H. FOLSOM

TRANSACTIONS 536 (1996).

& MICHAEL W. GORDON,

INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS
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fair competition in foreign markets.34

B. Regulation of Trade in Services
As countries venture increasingly into one another's service
markets, international efforts to deal with international trade in
services have also increased, 35 culminating 36 in the adoption of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 37 Considering
that many service industries are carefully regulated to protect the
public interest,3 8 GATS regulates trade barriers that distort
competition or restrict access to markets.39 Simultaneously, GATS
requires that legitimate policy objectives be pursued in order to
ensure the orderly functioning of markets. 4°
Consequently, restrictions on service suppliers in specified
fields and discrimination against foreign suppliers are considered

34 For the possible options for solving cases involving such anti-competitive
practices in the United States, see Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Corporate Counsel Committee
Briefing on International Antitrust and U.S.-Japan Relations, ASIL NEWSLETTER (The
Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, DC), Sept. 1995, availableat LEXIS.
35 See J. Steven Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services
and the WTO Instruments Relevant to the International Trade of FinancialServices: The
Lawyer's Perspective, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 70-71 (1999) (discussing
GATS as the result of the first step to internationally regulate the trade in services).
36 See Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition of Trade in Services under the GATS: Legal
Implications,32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 189, 189 (1999).
37 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. For a
full text of agreements resulting from the Uruguay round, see Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
38 See Chung-Han Kim, Cross-Border Transactions of Financial Services: A
Narrow Definition and Possibilityof Trade, 22 EcON. REv. 79, 99-101 (2004) (article in
Korean, title translated from Korean).
39 For the purpose of market access under GATS, see Ruth Ku, A GATT-Analogue
Approach to Analyzing the Consistency of the FCC's Foreign ParticipationOrder with
U.S. GATS MFN Commitments, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 111, 117 (1999)
(citing JOHN KRAUS, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND 43 (1994)).

40 For the most intractable barriers in services, see Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in
Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction
Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 45 n.27 (1995).
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barriers to service trade. 4' Regulations mandating compliance
with technical standards and qualification requirements to ensure
the quality of service and the protection of public interest are
considered necessary by the countries in question.42 Multilateral
negotiations have progressively liberalized GATS regulations by
removing trade barriers in service markets, while avoiding
restricting individual governments' authority to maintain and
develop the necessary regulations to pursue their national policy
objectives.43
Historically, international trade has been viewed as involving
only the movement of goods and services across national
borders." Trade in services under GATS should be much more
comprehensive, covering transactions that involve moving the
factors of production as well as the services themselves across
borders.45
With such an expanded definition of service trade,4 6 GATS
would be relevant to a wider range of domestic policies,
regulations, and measures 47 than GATT,48 since it would affect49
the supply of services which traditionally have not been touched

41 See GATS, supra note 37, art. XVII.
42 See id. art. VI (4).
43 See id. pmbl.
44 For the four levels of the differences between trade in goods and trade in
services, see Abu-Akeel, supra note 36, at 190.
45 See id. at 190-92 (discussing issues concerning the scope of applicability of
GATS due to the improper definition of the service activities in GATS).
46 For a background of the all-encompassing definition for modes of service
supply, see Simser, supra note 32, at 49 (citing Pierre Sauve, Assessing the General
Agreement in Trade in Services: Half-Full or Half-Empty?, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 128
(1995)).
47 The term "measures" covers any action taken by any level of government as well
by
non-governmental bodies to which regulatory powers have been delegated, taking
as
any form: law, regulation, administrative decision, guideline, or even unwritten practice.
GATS, supra note 37, art. XXVIII.
48 See Ku, supra note 39, at 116-17.
49 For the use of the term "affecting," rather than other terms such as "governing,"
see Jarreau, supra note 35, at 51-52 (citing Panel Report, European CommunitiesRegime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/Mex (May 22,
1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas]).
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upon by multilateral trade rules.5 ° Enforcing domestic policy in
the treatment of foreigners in their service activities,5 for example,
could be directly relevant to a country's obligations under GATS.
Thus, the obligations covered by GATS concern not only the
treatment of the service but also that of the service business or
service supplier,5 2 which, consequently, regulates the treatment of
foreign investors.53
While all GATS provisions are important with regard to
ensuring cooperation in opening service markets, the scope of
application differs, 4 thus setting GATS apart from other
agreements.55 All provisions in GATS are grouped into two
clauses: the most favored nation clause- 6 a horizontal clause to be
58
fulfilled in all sectors-57 and "the [n]ational [t]reatment clause [,]

50 See Simser, supra note 32, at 36-37 ("Prior to the Uruguay Round, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established
international frameworks (referred to as Codes) for liberalizing trade in services,
[however,] the OECD Codes did not provide a comprehensive ...multilateral agreement
to liberalize trade in services."); see also GATS, supra note 37, art. VI (6) (where
domestic regulation of professional activities is the most pertinent example).
51 See id. art. VI (Domestic Regulation) (containing the obligations of WTO
member countries for enforcing domestic policy in their service activities).
52 See Kearns, supra note 8, at 297.
53 See GATS, supra note 37, Part I. Thus GATS is the first multilateral treaty to
regulate the treatment of foreign investors. See id.
54 See GATS, supra note 37, Part III.
55 Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in
InternationalStandardsfor Lawyers and Access to the World Market?, 20 HAMLINE L.
REV. 667, 673 (1997).

56 GATS, supra note 37, art. II. GATT 1994 explains Most Favored Nation (MFN)
treatment as follows:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties.
GATT 1994, infra note 114, art. I(1).
57 For a discussion of the most-favored nation principle under GATS contemplating
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[which] is vertical, meaning that it is a conditional rule, the
application of which depends on specific commitments 9 made by
each country." 6 Further, "[i]f a member does make market access
commitments, and unless a reservation is otherwise recorded in a
member's schedule of commitments,
then full market access and
61
required.,
is
treatment
national
In sectors of scheduled specific commitments, all measures of
general application affecting trade in services 62 are to be
"a level, competitive playing field," see Jarreau, supra note 35, at 63 (interpreting the
EC-Bananas, supra note 49). For a discussion of the negative characteristics of GATS
with relation to the MFN principle in GATS, see Simser, supra note 32, at 49-51 ("in
GATS[,] . . . [miembers are permitted to schedule exemptions from MFN application.
The exemptions for MFN ... have been described as [a] structural weakness .... The
compromises necessary to create the agreement were driven by political considerations,
not purely by technical trade issues. If the goal of GATS was to create an allencompassing principle-based agreement, then GATS might be adjudged a failure.").
58 GATS, supra note 37, art. XVII. GATT 1994 explains National Treatment as
follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use ....
GATT 1994, infra note 114, art. IV(4).
59 Regarding the developing process of the Schedules of Specific Commitments,
see Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to TransactionalLawyering and Its Potential
Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 989, 1004
(2001).
60 See Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The CulturalException: Does It Exist In
GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on
TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 281, 299 (1997).
61 See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search
of a Problem? 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 77, 111-12 (2003). A member's schedule of
commitments states that "[a]ll schedules must specify: 1) terms, limitations, and
conditions on market access; 2) conditions and qualifications on national treatment; 3)
undertakings relating to additional commitments; 4) time frame for implementation of
commitments; and 5) date of entry into force of commitments." Id.
62 Id. at 113 ("Typical kinds of numerical limitations . . . inscribed . . . in the
schedule of commitments are: 1) limitations in the form of quotas or the requirement of
an economic needs test on the number of service suppliers or operations; 2) limitations in
the form of quotas on the total value of service transactions or assets; 3) measures that
restrict or require specific type of a legal entity or joint venture through which a service
supplier may supply a service; 4) limitations on the total number of natural persons that
may be employed in a particular service sector; and 5) limitations on the participation of
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"administered in a reasonable, objective[,] and impartial
manner." 63 This obligation focuses on the manner in which
measures are administered and not on their substance,64 under
which foreign service suppliers shall not be discriminated against
or impeded in their work by the arbitrary or biased administration
of the regulations. 6' Thus, the measures should be based on
"objective and transparent criteria" such as competence and the
ability to supply the service.6 6 Moreover, they should not be
"more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the
67
service.,

C. Regulation of Treatment of ForeignInvestment
Since the 1948 Havana Charter containing provisions on the
treatment of foreign investment failed to be ratified, only its
provisions on commercial policy were incorporated into GATT
1947.68 Thus, the link between trade and investment has attracted
little attention in the framework of the GATT,6 9 which did not

foreign capital in terms of a maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the
total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment.").
63 GATS, supra note 37, art. VI(l).
64 For a discussion of the GATS principles deriving such obligation, see Jarreau,
supra note 35, at 66.
65 Id. ("Article VI [Domestic Regulation] is intended to prevent Members from
denying, nullifying, or impairing GATS benefits to other WTO Members through the use
of onerous domestic administrative measures.")
66 For the transparency obligation under GATS, see GATS, supra note 37, art.
VI(4)(a).
67 GATS, supra note 37, art. VI(4)(b). For an analysis of the proportionality
provision in GATS, see also Trachtman, supra note 40, at 88-89.
68 For more on negotiating a multilateral investment treaty, see Todd S. Shenkin,
Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT:
Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PiTT. L. REv. 541, 544 (1994)
(citing Jeswald W. Salacuse, Towards a New Treaty Framework For Direct Foreign
Investment, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 969, 1005-09 (1985) (arguing for a general agreement
on direct investment)).
69 For a review of the foreign direct investment among GAT[ members during the
period 1960 to 1981, see Robert H. Edwards Jr. & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More
Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 188 (1997) (citing TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2056-57 (1995)).
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seem compatible to the globalization of modem economy.7 °
Perhaps the most significant development with respect to
investment during the period before the Uruguay Round was a
ruling under the GATT dispute panel between the United States
and Canada. Due to Canada's Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act (FIRA), 7" "an example of a statutory
scheme that provided for the negotiation of particularized
requirements on a case-by-case basis[,], 7 2 a GATT dispute
settlement panel decided that the local content requirements73 were
inconsistent with the national treatment obligation of the GATT,
but that the export performance requirements,74 some of the "most
trade-distorting" trade-related investment measures (TRIMs),75
were consistent with GATT obligations.76
The panel decision in the FIRA case ensured that existing
obligations under GATT were applicable to performance
requirements imposed in the investment context, if the
requirements involve trade-distorting measures." Simultaneously,
70 For the need to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty under the modem
economy, see Shenkin, supra note 68, at 579.
71 For more detailed information on Canada's FIRA, see Shenkin, supra note 68, at
561-62.
72 Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 69, at 186.
73 Local content requirement is a kind of government non-tariff barrier which
imposes the use of a certain amount of local input in production. See Y. S. Lee,
Bilateralism under the World Trade Organization, 26 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 357, 366
(2006); see also, Stewart, supra note 12, at 699.
74 See Victor Mosoti, The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Meeting the Development
Challenge, 15 PACE INT'L L. REv. 181, 188 n.29 (2003) (explaining the analysis of local
content requirements and export performance requirements in Canada-Administration of
Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of Panel, BISD 30S/140 (1984)). Export
performance requirements are undertakings requiring foreign investors to export certain
amounts or percentages of output imposed by the host country's authorities as the
condition for approval of investment projects. Id.
75 See Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 69, at 191.
76 See Paul Civello, The TRIMs Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment
Liberalization, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 97, 99 (1999) ("local content requirements

mandating the use of domestically produced products, local equity requirements
affecting ownership, foreign exchange restrictions, and export or trade-balancing
requirements.") (citing Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, The United
States-Latin American Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 127 (1995)).
77 See Shenkin, supra note 68, at 563-64.
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the panel's conclusion that export performance requirements were
not covered by GATT also underscored the limited scope of
existing GATT disciplines with respect to such trade-related
performance requirements.78
During the Uruguay Round negotiations that concerned traderelated investment measures, 79 there was strong disagreement
among participants over the coverage and nature of possible new
disciplines. 80 The resulting WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), 8 ' is essentially limited to the
application of the trade-related investment measures of GATT
provisions to national treatment 82 and quantitative restrictions of
imports or exports, 83 and does not cover other measures, such as
export performance and the transfer of technology requirements.84
Since it is based on existing GATT disciplines on trade in
goods, the TRIMs Agreement is not concerned with the regulation
of service or foreign investment itself.85 Consequently, the
imposition of regulations concerning discrimination between
domestic and foreign investors in TRIMs could not be treated
only
multilaterally under the TRIMs Agreement but rather
86
agreements.
regional
the
under
plurilaterally
or
bilaterally
78 See Edwards, Jr. & Lester, supra note 69, at 191.
79 See id. at 210-11 (categorizing TRIMs into "traffic light categories"). This
categorization is similar to the Swiss government's proposal, made during the Uruguay
Round negotiations, which divided TRIMs into the same three categories: prohibited,
permitted, and actionable. See id. at 211.
80 For a discussion of the two issues central to the TRIMs negotiations, see
Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 69, at 194.
81 Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIMs Agreement].
82 See id. art. II (citing GATT, infra note 114, art. III).
83 See id. (citing GATT, infra note 114, art. XI). For more details about TRIMs
Agreement's failure to cover more provisions, see Civello, supra note 76, at 97.
84 For the Multilateral Agreement on Investment proposed by the OECD as an
alternative to inefficient TRIMs, see Civello, supra note 76, at 123.
85 See Shenkin, supra note 68, at 565 (explaining that a local content requirement
imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner on domestic and foreign enterprises is
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement because it involves discriminatory treatment of
imported products in favor of domestic products).
86 See id. at 566 ("Although [foreign investors] are directly affected by TRIMs
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III. Trade Barriers in the Korean Market
A. General
"During the dynamic period of economic growth and
development from the 1960s to the 1990s, the Korean government
promoted economic development much more directly and
positively than any other Asian country[, ' 87 resulting in a greater
unevenness in "income growth, prices, trade[,] and [in the pattern
of] structural change., 8 8 During this time period, the government
maintained a "positive role" in the management of the Korean
economy. 89 The condensed growth initiated by the government
has been achieved at the cost of development of a national
competition policy, 90 which in turn raises the costs to foreign
service suppliers or investors accessing and doing business in the
Korean service market. 91
In service markets, domestic regulation is a more important
and serious trade barrier than in commodities markets. 92 Despite
the Korean government's efforts,93 Korean laws and regulations
related to trade in services as well as to trade in goods have
generally been criticized for lacking specificity94 and
transparency 95 in the rulemaking procedures and in maintaining

imposed by host countries on their investments, they have no legal recourse [under the
TRIMs Agreement;] only goods producers do.").
87 Eun Sup Lee, Anti Competitive Practicesas Trade Barriersused by Korean and
Japan, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 177, 184-85 (2004) (citing SOON CHO, THE DYNAMICS OF
KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27-59 (1994).
88 Id. at 184-85.
89 See id.
90 See id.

91 See Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Foreign Trade in Korea, 26 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 135, 135-36 (1996).
92 See GATS, supra note 37, art. VI.
93 See, e.g., WTO, Trade Policy Review-Korea: 2000 (2000), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/tpr..e/tp138_e.htm.
The "Korean government has made effects to
improve transparency in trade and investment policies." Id.
94 See Eun Sup Lee, Safeguard Mechanism in Korea Under the WTO World, 14
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 323, 355 (2001).
95 For the requirements of transparency, see GATS, supra note 37, art. III.
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regulatory systems.96 Internal office guidance, for example,
developed by relevant government agencies but rarely published, 97
gives direction in the implementation of regulations. Also,
adequate information about planned or actual changes to laws and
regulations is not available. 98 This system gives governmental
officials leeway to exercise wide discretion in applying laws and
regulations, resulting in inconsistency in their application and
"uncertainty" in doing business in Korea. 99
Korea maintains restrictions in some service sectors through a
negative list,'00 in which foreign investment is prohibited or
severely circumscribed through equity or other restrictions, and is
the member
in line with the GATS spirit and disciplines to allow
01
countries to make scheduled specific commitments.

96 For detailed criticism raised by the United States, see OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,

2006 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE

at 412-13, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2006/2006_NTEReport/asset-upload file682_9188.pdf (last visited Mar.
2, 2007) [hereinafter 2006 NTE (KOREA)].
97 See GATS, supra note 37, art. III.
98 See Eun Sup Lee, Anti-competitive Practices as Trade Barriers used by Korea
and Japan, presented at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific Conference held by Ritsumeikan Asia
Pacific University, Japan, 12, Nov. 28-29, 2003 (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
BARRIERS (KOREA),

99 See 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 413.
100 A negative list for trade in services allows for trade in any service unless it
is specifically 'excluded' in the trade treaty, while a positive list allows for
trade only if a service is specifically 'included' in the trade treaty. As such, a
negative list is considered to be more liberal in encouraging international trade
than a positive list.
Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 487, 493 n.21 (2006).
101 GATS, supra note 37, Part III. There have been disputes on both positive list
and negative list approaches to schedule market access commitments among the Round
participants during the Uruguay Round, and the resulting specific commitments made
under the GATS have been a mixture of both approaches:
Only those industries listed in a member's schedule of commitments are open to
foreign service suppliers with respect to at least one mode of supply (i.e., a
positive list approach). However, if a member has made a commitment, only
the conditions, limitations, or qualifications on market access and national
treatment listed in the schedule may be imposed (i.e., a negative list approach).
Kennedy, supra note 61, at Ill (footnote omitted). As such, under the negative list
approach, "a member is prohibited from maintaining or adopting several types of

2007]

JAPANESE & KOREAN TRADE BARRIERS

B. Non-financial Markets
Korea is among the world's top advertising markets, but also
one of the most highly restricted. 10 2 Although the Korean
government has progressively implemented some market-oriented
measures in recent years, 0 3 anti-competitive practices" have
shackled the flexibility0 5 of advertisers to respond to their
immediate market needs.1
Anti-competitive advertising censorship procedures, have been
reported.'0 6 As a result, advertising materials must be submitted in
fully produced film format rather than as storyboard, significantly
increasing the risks and costs of developing new advertising

campaigns and introducing new brands.0 7 These practices may be
in breach of provisions prohibiting unnecessary restrictions to
trade in services" as well as provisions affording protection to
materials submitted under GATS1°9 and Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)."0 In addition, products that
have been tested and approved in other countries must be re-tested

limitations or measures, unless it has otherwise so specified in its schedule." Id. at 112
(footnote omitted).
102 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 407.
103 These measures include the Global Standard system offering advertising airtime
in various time lengths and providing more purchasing flexibility. See OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN

TRADE BARRIERS (KOREA),

305, http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Document Library"

hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications" hyperlink; then follow "2004
USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2004 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow "Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2,
2007) [hereinafter 2004 NTE (KOREA)].
104 These practices are regulated under GATS. See GATS, supra note 37, arts. VIII,

Ix.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 305.
108 See GATS, supra note 37, art. VI(4).
109 Id. art. III bis.
110 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), art. 39
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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in Korea,"' a practice which may
be inconsistent with GATS as
2
well as other WTO provisions."1
The Korean film industry's strict screen quota system is
considered discouraging to trade, cinema construction, the
expansion of film distribution in Korea, and the overall
competitiveness of the Korean film industry." 13 Korea's insistence
on keeping its strict screen quotas has been a topic of dispute in
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, which could be
approved under the provisions of the current GATT 1 4 and
GATS," 5 but has nevertheless been controversial in terms of
progressive liberalization." 6
Korea restricts foreign activities in the TV sector by limiting
monthly broadcasting time, maintaining annual quotas for foreign
broadcast motion pictures and animation, and restricting foreign

1 See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 305.
112 See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round (1994), art. 6.3 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
113 Korea maintains screen quotas on imported motion pictures, requiring that
domestic films be shown in each cinema a minimum number of days per year (currently,
146 days with reductions to 73 days if certain criteria are met). 2006 NTE (KOREA),
supra note 96, at 407.
114 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, arts. 3, 4, 10 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT parties adopted GATT
again in 1994, with minor changes, as part of the agreement creating the WTO. When it
is necessary to distinguish the two, they are called "GATT 1947" and "GATT 1994."
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. 11(4). For details on the GATT cinema provisions,
see GATT 1994, art. IV:
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative regulations
relating to exposed cinematograph films, such regulations shall take the form of
screen quotas which shall conform to the following requirements: (a) screen
quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin
during a specified minimum proportion ... in the commercial exhibition of all
films of whatever origin ....
(c) any contracting party may maintain screen
quotas ... which reserve a minimum proportion of screen time for films of a
specified origin . . . (d) screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their
limitation, liberalization or elimination.
Id.
115 GATS makes an exception for protecting "public morals" or "public order."
GATS, supra note 37, art. XIV(a).
116

Id. art. VI.
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investment in broadcasting.' 17 These last restrictions could
become a controversy between the domestic policy objectives 1 8
promoted by the Korean government and the national treatment" 9
claimed by the partner countries.
Korea regulates its cable TV sector through annual quotas. 2 '
These quotas limit market access and the development of Korea's
film and animation industries. 12 1 In addition, "[tihe Korean
government [] restricts foreign ownership of cable televisionrelated system[s,]" program providers, and foreign participation in
satellite broadcasts. 122 These restrictions could basically be in
accordance with the frameworks and requirements of GATS, 12 3
which allow a member to schedule its market access commitments
in order to "list the service sectors and modes of supply for which
individual members have agreed to provide full or practical access
to service suppliers of other WTO members[."' 24 However, such
commitments have become controversial with trade partner
countries in terms of progressive liberalization. 125
GATS
"contemplates that the process of progressive liberalization may
take place through bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral
negotiations in each round, provided they
are aimed at raising the
126
overall level of specific commitments."'
The Korean professional service market has been an important
target of trade disputes, especially since the financial crisis in

117 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 408.
118 GATS, supra note 37, pmbl, art. VI.
119 See id. art. XVII.
120 See 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 408.
121 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

2005 NATIONAL TRADE

http://www.ustr.gov
(follow "Document Library" hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications"
hyperlink; then follow "2005 USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2005
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow
"Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter 2005 NTE (KOREA)].
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (KOREA), at 380,

122 See 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 408.

123 See GATS, supra note 37, arts. XIV, XVI.
124 Kennedy, supra note 61, at 110.
125 See 2005 NTE (KOREA), supra note 121, at 380-81.
126 Kennedy, supra note 61, at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
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1997.127 For example, 128 despite the Korean government's efforts

to liberalize the legal services market, 129 Korea has been criticized
for not providing for foreign legal consultants, 130 thus creating
serious3 2 difficulties for foreign lawyers' 3 ' employed by local
firms. 1

Korea also restricts the establishment of foreign accounting
firms 133 and foreign Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) are
required to fulfill the same requirements as Korean CPAs. 134 For
example, accounting firms in Korea are prohibited from making an
investment in or providing a debt guarantee to any other firm in
excess of ten percent of the accounting firm's paid-in-capital.' 35
127 See Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practicesas Trade Barriers Used by Korea
and Japan: Focusing on Service and Investment Markets, 16 BOND L. REV. 117, 144
(2004).
128 The empirical "study of the effects of the deregulation of legal services ... in
Great Britain provides some insights into the potential benefits of terminating a cartel in
a legal services market" in Korea. Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Liberalizing
InternationalTrade in Legal Services: A Proposalfor an Annex on Legal Services under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 955 (1995)
(citing Simon Domberger & Avrom Sherr, The Impact of Competition on Pricing and
Quality of Legal Services, 9 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 41, 41 (1989)).
129 These include the amendment not only of the Lawyer Act to permit foreigners to
be licensed to practice law in Korea in 1996, but also of the Regulation in Foreign
Investment in 1977 to allow for foreign investment in the legal sector. 2004 NTE
(KOREA), supra note 103, at 307.
130 For some of the reasons for the scope of practice restriction to foreign lawyers,
including protecting the public, see Orlando Flores, Prospects for Liberalizing the
Regulation of Foreign Lawyers Under GATT And NAFTA, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
159, 165 (1996) (citing John Haley, The New Regulatory Regime for ForeignLawyers in
Japan: An Escape From Freedom, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 14 (1986)); Richard L.
Abel, The Futureof the Legal Profession: TransnationalLaw Practice,44 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 737, 751 (1994).
131 For other forms of the regulation of foreign lawyers in general, see Flores, supra
note 130, at 164, 167-68, 170.
132 For some of the rationales upon which Korean authorities rely to restrict access
to foreign attorneys, see Chapman & Tauber, supra note 128, at 952-53.
133 In Korea, such restrictions include the requirement of a minimum number of
Korean-certificated accountants/partners employed. Id. at 951.
134 "Foreign . . . CPAs are required to fulfill the same requirements as Korean
CPAs, including: i) obtaining Korean certification; ii) completing a two-year internship;
and iii) registering with the public accountants association." 2005 NTE (KOREA), supra
note 121, at 381.
135 Id.
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These restrictive requirements are justified currently under GATS
provisions'36 and are required to be reviewed from the viewpoint
of the productivity and efficiency of the Korean accounting
industry as well as policy objectives.' 37
In the engineering industry, "although there are no [legal]
restrictions on foreign engineering services[,] procuring agencies
(national, local[,] and private) can specify particular conditions [on
a discretionary basis] ...

depending

on the nature

of the

project[,]J " 38 possibly raising national treatment 39 and
transparency 4 ° issues.
The anti-competitive or unfair trade practices discussed above
may deviate from the spirit of the WTO provisions concerned and
the international norms discussed. Moreover, some elements of
these practices are affected by the social or cultural circumstances
specific to Korea. The social and cultural aspects of such
practices, however, are too complicated and controversial to be
justified under current WTO provisions.
C. FinancialMarkets
Despite the Korean government's efforts to improve the
financial market,' 4 ' foreign-based, non-financial organizations in
Korea are required to follow burdensome and costly procedural
requirements for financial transactions 42 that are incompatible
with Korea's level of development and financial sophistication.43
"Virtually all intra-company
transfers are subject to
certification[,] ...

which is a cumbersome, and unnecessary

requirement,
particularly
for
transactions
between
J
44
subsidiaries[.] " This requirement seems to reflect the positive
policy objectives of the Korean government to regulate the

136 GATS, supra note 37, art. XVI.
137 See id. art. VI.
138 2005 NTE (KOREA), supra note 121, at 381-82.

139 See GATS, supra note 37, art. XVII.
140 See id. art. III.
141 For details, see 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 409-10.
142 See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 307.
143 See id.
144 Id.
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improper internal transactions, particularly of conglomerates.
Even though most foreign exchange and capital account
transactions for individuals have been liberalized, 145 foreign
exchange transactions and derivatives trading
by corporations and
46
financial institutions are still regulated. 1
Almost all of the restrictions imposed by the Korean
government on financial market and foreign exchange transactions
seem to reflect Korea's unique domestic situation.
These
restrictions are difficult to justify in the face of the policy
objectives 14 or procedural requirements 14 provisioned by GATS.
For example, policy decisions on the complete liberalization of
exchange transactions would require the consideration of the
political and social situation unique to a peninsula divided into two
politically controversial regimes, not to mention the economic and
legal considerations which are common to all countries.' 49 These

policies could be justified under GATS provisions on policy
objectives with sufficient rationale and evidence. It would be
difficult, however, to establish sufficient rationales and evidence
for those restrictions, particularly without clear construction of the
WTO provisions to take into account such unique situations of the
member countries. 5 0
In the insurance industry, which has been the central target of
trade disputes with the United States since the 1980s,"5 ' the
regulatory environment for foreign insurance companies has
improved considerably "since Korea implemented a series of
15 2
regulatory changes following its 1996 OECD accession[.]'
145 See Foreign Exchange Transactions Law, Law No. 7716 (2005), available at
http://www.kiaw.go.kr/CNT2/Easy/MCNT2EasyLawService.jsp?s-lawmst=72182
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2007) (in Korean).
146 See 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 410.

147 See GATS, supra note 37, pmbl.
148

See id. art. VI.

See id. pmbl, art. VI.
150 Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practicesas Trade Barriers Used by Korea and
Japan: Focusing on Service and Investment Markets, 16 BOND L. REV. 117, 146 n.169
(2004).
151 See Lee, supra note 91, at 156-58.
149

152 OFFICE OF THE

U.S.

2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
at 254, http://www.ustr.gov (follow
"USTR Reports and Publications"

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (KOREA),

"Document Library" hyperlink; then follow
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However, "a considerable gap remains between Korea's practices
and those found in more developed insurance markets."''
The ambitious restructuring of the Korean insurance industry
has been encouraged since the 1997 financial crisis'54 through the

newly established Financial Supervisory Service (FSS),'55 the
Korean government's financial watchdog and center for financial
reform.' 56 The FSS has encouraged restructuring by way of
insolvency or implementing workout programs 5 7 supervised by
the FSC. While insurance companies and banks are regulated by
experienced officials of the FSS, however, the government-run
Korea Post is overseen "by the Ministry of Information and
Communication which does not have the same regulatory
expertise."' 5 8
Moreover, "[u]nlike private sector insurance
companies, which must follow more stringent regulations prior to
introducing new products or in training new staff, Korea Post
enjoys a streamlined, less regulatory ability to introduce new
products and is not subject
to the same training and examination
59
insurance sales staff." 1
hyperlink; then follow "2003 USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2003
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow
"Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter 2003 NTE (KOREA)]. For
more details, see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Korea and
the
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_33873108_338735551 1 1 _,00.html
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
153 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 409.
154 For details on the Korean financial crisis in 1997, see David Richardson, Asian

Financial Crisis, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group (Austrl.), June
29, 1998, Current Issues Brief No. 23 1997-98, available at http://www.
aph.gov.aulibrary/pubs/cib/1997-98/98cib23.htm.
155 Since the financial crisis, the Korean government has been gradually liberalizing
foreign entry into the life and non-life insurance markets, has lifted some restrictions on
partnering with Korean insurance companies and hiring Korean insurance professionals,
and has liberalized insurance appraisals and activities ancillary to the management of
insurance and pension funds. See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 307-08.
156 See Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Insurance Contracts in Korea, 13 TRANSNAT'L
LAW 1, 5 (2000).

157 See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 307 ("A workout program is a
voluntary, out of court debt- restructuring framework, which may or may not involve
government oversight.")
158 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 409.
159 Id.
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In the banking industry, despite the Korean government's
positive efforts at restructuring since the financial crisis, 161 "the
International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the U.S. government have
strongly urged Korea to privatize state-owned banks, which would
allow market forces to more efficiently allocate financial resources
' 61
and increase investor confidence in the Korean economy."'
Korea has been criticized for restricting the operations of
162
foreign bank branches based on branch capital requirements.
For example, "[floreign banks are subject to the same lending
ratios as Korean banks, which require them to allocate a certain
share of their loan portfolios to Korean companies other than the
top four chaebol conglomerates"' 163 as well as to "small and
medium enterprises."' In addition, "[a]lthough foreign investors
may legally become majority owners of Korean banks, this has
proven to be difficult in practice.,' 165 Thus, all banks in Korea
suffer from a non-transparent regulatory system and are required
to seek approval before introducing new products and servicesan area where foreign banks are most competitive-which may be
in breach 67
of GATS provisions on transparency 66 and national
1
treatment.
In the securities industry, despite the Korean government's
liberalization, 168 foreign securities firms in Korea have allegedly69
encountered some non-prudential barriers to their operations.
160

For more details, see 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 308.

161 Id.

"These restrictions limit: loans to individual customers; foreign exchinge trade;
and foreign-bank capital adequacy and liquidity requirements." Id.
163 Id. Chaebol conglomerates share three common characteristics: "i) a governance
structure of family dominance; ii) an organizational structure of a holding company
controlling formally independent firms; and iii) a business structure of extensive
diversification."
STEPHEN HAGGARD ET AL., ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL 3 (2003).
164 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 410.
162

165 2003 NTE (KOREA), supra note 152, at 255.
166

See GATS, supra note 37, art. III.

167

See id. art. XVII.

168 For the Korean government's liberalization measures, see 2006 NTE (KOREA),
supra note 96, at 410.
169 For the provision about prudential measures as the prudential curve-out, see
Jarreau, supra note 35, at 67 (citing WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL
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Substantial parts of the Korean government's measures in the
financial sector have been evaluated as anti-competitive or nontransparent by trade partner countries such as the United States.'
These accusations of anti-competitive practices reveal different
priorities. For example, the Korean government's basic policy has
been to give a higher priority to stabilizing the markets and
protecting public interest than promoting market mechanisms or
efficient allocation of resources. This is in contrast to other
advanced western countries, where market functions are strongly
pursued by the governments.17 '
The Korean government's
positive restrictions on foreign
exchange
transactions could also
172
reflect the same situation.
The recognition of such differences in policy objectives among
the member countries may represent one of the rationales for
strengthening the importance of domestic regulations in the
service sector in GATS,73 which differs substantially from GATT in
the commodity sector. 1
D. Investment Markets
The Korean government has been strongly committed to
creating a more favorable investment climate and to facilitating
foreign investment since the financial crisis in 1997,174 but
additional steps, including resolution of certain labor market
issues, reduction of labor-management disputes and improvement
of regulatory transparency are required to fully achieve this
goal.'75 The 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act "expanded
business sectors open to foreign investment[,] expanded tax
incentives[,] simplified' 176investment procedures[,] and established
Free Economic Zones."

SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 76 (1998)). For the proper measures created for
prudential reasons, see Simser, supra note 32, at 57.
170 See, e.g., 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 409-10.
171

See Lee, supra note 156, at 34-35.

172

See Lee, supra note 91, at 141-42.

173 See GATS, supra note 37, art. VI.
174 See 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 309.
175

See 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 411.

176 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 309. The Free Economic Zones have an
extensive range of incentives including tax breaks, tariff-free importation, relaxed labor
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The Korean government is required to automatically approve
foreign investors' notification of their investment into Korea
unless the activity appears on an explicit "negative list ' ' 1 7 or is
related to national security, the maintenance of public order or the
protection of public health, morality, or safety, which are generally
excused under the WTO mechanism.'78 "Since May 1998,
foreigners have been permitted to engage in hostile takeovers and
may purchase 100 percent of a target company's outstanding stock
without consent of its board of directors."' 179 Traditionally, this
was a point of contention with trade partner countries, although
the Korean government proclaimed an open policy for inward
foreign investment.' 80
The 2006 National Trade Estimate for Korea 18' reported that:
[c]apital market reforms have eliminated or raised the
ceiling in aggregate foreign equity ownership, on
individual foreign ownership[,] and on foreign investment
in the government, corporate, and special bond markets.
These reforms also have liberalized foreign purchases of
short-term financial instruments issued by corporate and
financial institutions. However, the Korean government
still maintains foreign equity restrictions with respect to
investments in various state-owned firms and many types
of media, including.., cable and satellite television
services and channel
operators, as well as schools and beef
82
wholesalers. 1
These restrictions may be evaluated case by case under the criteria

rules, and improved living conditions for expatriates in areas such as housing, education,
and medical services. 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 411. The Korean
government still maintains foreign equity restrictions with respect to investments in
various state-owned firms and many types of media as well as schools and beef
wholesale. See id.
177 This requirement, for example, may be relevant to the spirit of the GATS
provisions (Part III, Specific Commitment) applied to scheduled specific sections in
which positive regulations are imposed by negative methods. 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra
note 103, at 309.
178 See GATT 1994, supra note 114, art. XX; GATS, supra note 37, art. XIV.
179 2004 NTE (KOREA), supra note 103, at 309.
180 See id.

181 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 411.
182 Id.
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of policy objectives 8 3 or domestic regulations 84 provided in the
WTO Agreements without pure investment-specified provisions.
The Korean government removed restrictions on the direct
purchase of land by foreigners 85 through the 2004 revision of the
Non-Koreans,
Alien Land Registration Acquisition Act. 8 6
however, still cannot produce certain agricultural products for
commercial purposes, or take agriculturally-zoned land out of
agricultural production.1 7 These restrictions are regarded as
investment barriers 188 and they may conflict with the policy
objectives under GATS, considering the traditional Korean policy
in the agricultural sector. 8 9 While the more liberalized Korean
investment regime has increased foreign investors' interest in
Korea, additional changes 9 ° are required by the trade partner
countries to improve Korea's attractiveness for foreign
investment. 191
Objectively assessing the Korean government's policy for the
liberalization and deregulation of the inward foreign investment

183 See GATS, supra note 37, pmbl.
184 See id. art. VI.
185 See Choi Kyong-ae, Foreignersown 17% of Big Buildings in Seoul, THE KOREA
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, available at http://search.hankooki.com/times/timesindex.htm
(search for "foreigners" and "Seoul," date restrict from "October 12, 2004" to "October
12, 2004") (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). As of August, 2004, foreigners are reported to
own 17% of big buildings with more than II stories in Seoul. Id. "In Asia, the most
attractive property market is reported to be Japan where US dollars 784 billion worth of
properties are earmarked for foreigners. Korea has 4901 billion US dollars worth of
properties available for foreign investment." Id.
186 Foreigner's Land Acquisition Act, Law No. 7297 (2004), available at
(last
http://www.klaw.go.kr/CNT2/Easy/MCNT2EasyLawService.jsp?s-lawmst=66247
visited Mar. 2, 2007) (in Korean).
187 2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 411. These kinds of regulations are, of
course, beyond the application of WTO provisions when they are not related to the goods
trade.
188 Id.
189 See GATS, supra note 37, art. VI.
190 Such changes include "resolving certain
mobility, more flexibility in hiring and firing
compensation, less rigid worker visa rules, and
services), reducing labor-management disputes, and
2006 NTE (KOREA), supra note 96, at 411.
191 Id.

market issues (e.g. better pension
workers, expanded unemployment
better job training and placement
improving regulatory transparency."
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market is difficult without internationally accepted regulatory
mechanisms. For now, the investment environment in Korea
seems anemic to foreign investors and is not as attractive as the
92
government's ambitious policy to improve it.'
IV. Trade Barriers in Japanese Market
A. General
For the majority of the post-war era, the principal goal of
Japan's economic policy has been development and stability.' 93
Free competition has sometimes appeared to be inimical to that
goal. 194 As such, competition policies which have been treated as
organizing principles for the economy,' 95 rather than as regulation
196
policies, have resulted in a regulation-based economy.
Consequently, "Japan's economy today suffers from over
regulation and its concomitant inefficiency, while at the same time
Japanese social and labor conditions are relatively stable."' 9 7
Although Japan has recently responded to internal and external
requirements, 198 by focusing on deregulation, 99 over-regulation in

192 For the gap between the government's policy and the practical environments of
the foreign direct investment in Korea, see Kil Sum Kim, M&A as Violent Gale, KOREAN
INST. FOR LAB. STUD. AND POLICIES, available at http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/
98/981202.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (in Korean).
193 Economic stability has been regarded as presupposing a relatively high level of
government intervention in business planning. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 187.
194 See id.

For the relative priorities of competition policy in Japan, see Lee, supra note
150, at 151 n. 195 (citing Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in
Japan,OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 4 (2000)).
196 For criticism against the Japanese competition policy, see Southwick, supra note
23, at 949.
197 Abbott, supra note 9, at 187-88.
195

198 See id. at 337-38 (discussing the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition
Policy Initiative operated by the United States and Japan for bilateral efforts to promote
comprehensive deregulation and structural reform in Japan).
199 For the structural reform of the Japanese government, see OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS (JAPAN), at 346-52, http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Document Library"
hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications" hyperlink; then follow "2006
USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2006 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow "Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2,
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Japan has hampered economic growth, raising the cost of doing
business and impeding imports and foreign investment,
particularly in the service markets. 2° Some Japanese regulations
aim squarely at the entry of foreign services in order to protect the
status quo against market entrance. 20 ' These regulations, however,
have stifled entrepreneurship and inhibited risk-taking and
innovation.2 °2
As a world leader, the Japanese service and investment market
has traditionally been the core target of trade disputes with other
trade partner countries including the United States, 203 even under
the WTO mechanism. 24
The highly regulated, inefficient
system 2 5 in the Japanese distribution markets, for example, has
widely been acknowledged as a significant trade and investment
barrier.20 6 Distribution issues in Japan have been addressed by
trade partner countries through basic approaches focusing on
"aspects of competition law, deregulation of measures supporting
restrictive distribution structures, and agreements calling upon the
Japanese government to use administrative guidance and moral
persuasion to loosen the tight relationships between Japanese
producers and distributors.,, 20 7 "The central issue with regulatory

2007) [hereinafter 2006 NTE (JAPAN)].

200 See id. at 368-72.
201 For the partner countries' concerns about the law enforcement effects of the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission relating to market access, see Lee, supra note 87, at
193 n.1 10.
202 For details on the Japanese government regulations and measures, see 2006 NTE
(JAPAN), supra note 199, at 346-49.

203 See Wolff, supra note 32, at 1024.
204 See id. at 1025-26 (commenting on the fitness of the WTO to treat Japan's
special trade barriers).
205 For the difficult situation foreign companies face in getting access to distribution
in Japan, see Southwick, supra note 23, at 927 (citing OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1999 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE

BARRIERS 205, 215).

206 "Domination of the distribution system by Japanese producers can create a
significant market access problem in many industries in Japan because of the cost, risk,
and difficulty of establishing an alternative distribution network." Id. at 928 (citing H.
IYORI & A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN, at app. H
(1994)).
207 Id. at 929.
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barriers raised in the disputes is seemingly a bias against new
may appear in
entrants, new products, and lower prices, which
20 8
regulations that are simply too rigid or vague.
B. Non-financialMarkets
With regard to professional services, the ability of foreign
firms and individuals to provide professional services in Japan has
been hampered by a complex network of legal, regulatory, and
commercial practice barriers.2 °9 In the accounting and auditing
services market, foreign service providers have allegedly faced a
series of regulatory and market access barriers in Japan which
have impeded their ability to serve this important market. 210 These
barriers include requiring foreign CPAs to register as members of
the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, prohibition
of foreign CPA audit activities, prohibition of audit corporations'
provision of tax-related services, and other requirements which are
burdensome to foreign CPAs.21
Foreign lawyers have sought greater access to Japan's legal
services market and the full freedom to associate with Japanese
lawyers (bengoshi) since the 1970s.212 However, strong opposition
from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) and
a reluctant Japanese bureaucracy has largely thwarted this
objective. 213 "In Japan, one of the largest legal markets in the
world, foreign and local lawyers face strict regulation. 214 Since
1987, Japan has allowed foreign lawyers to establish offices and
advise on matters concerning the law of their home jurisdictions in
Japan as foreign legal consultants, subject to certain restrictions.215

208

Id. at 956.

209 See id. at 928, 956.
210 Lee, supra note 150, at 153.
211 See id. at 153-54.
212 See Chapman & Tauber, supra note 128, at 961 n.116 (discussing the substantial
pressure from the United States and the European Union on Japanese officials to reduce
restrictions on foreign lawyers).
213 See Karen Dillon, Unfair Trade?, AM. LAW., April 1994, at 53 (discussing the
cultural concerns to limit foreign lawyers' scope of practice apart from the fear of lack of
qualifications).
214 Flores, supra note 130, at 169.
215 Gaikoku Bengoshi niyoru Horitsujimu no Toriatsukai ni kansuru Tokubetsusochi
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While Japan has liberalized several restrictions on foreign
lawyers, the most critical structural deficiency in Japan's
international legal services sector is that severe limitations are
imposed on the relationships between Japanese lawyers and
registered foreign legal consultants.2 16 Foreign lawyers are
allowed to form limited partnerships,2 7 called specified joint
enterprises (tokutei kyodo kigyo), instead of allowing bengoshi and
foreign lawyers (gaiben) to form partnerships. These joint
enterprises are highly regulated and do not provide the framework
needed for effective teamwork between bengoshi and gaiben.
Further adjustments to that system will not meet the needs of
foreign lawyers in Japan.218
Foreign lawyers are required to follow strict accounting
guidelines in order to share offices, and the joint enterprise can
give only limited advice on Japanese law.219 Japanese lawyers can
form partnerships with individual foreign lawyers, but not with a
foreign lawyer's law firm. 220 The "restrictions on foreign lawyers
to employ or form partnerships with local lawyers severely
handicaps a law firm's ability to serve its clients, and inhibits the
growth of international law firms because they force branch
offices to farm out work locally., 221 In addition, Japan requires
annual residency of 180 days and limits foreign lawyers to only

Ho, (Act Providing Special Measures for Handling Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers),
in 2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 613 (Z. Kitagawa, ed. 1987)). The law basically
"conditions the ability of a foreign lawyer to practice in Japan on reciprocal treatment of
Japanese lawyers in the foreign lawyer's home country." Chapman & Tauber, supra note
128, at 961 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: MODEL RULE FOR THE LICENSING OF

LEGAL CONSULTANTS, 28 INT'L LAW. 207, 212-13 (1994)).

216 Amongst the industrialized countries, Japan's regulations on foreign lawyers
have been reported to be the most stringent and discriminatory. See Chapman & Tauber,
supra note 128, at 960.
217 See Flores, supra note 130, at 168-69.
218 See Dillon supra note 213, at 53.
219 See id. at 55.
220 Id.
221 Flores, supra note 130, at 169 (citing Bob Rossi, NAFTA Won't Open Doors for
Lawyers; Despite Negotiations, Limits on Foreign Law Practices Will Remain, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1993, at 8).
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one office in Japan.22 2 These regulations, combined with the high
cost of maintaining an office in Tokyo, effectively keep most
foreign lawyers out of practice in Japan.223
Furthermore, education, language, and cultural differences
have worked to keep foreign lawyers from establishing a larger
presence in Japan.224
With regard to determining legal
professionals' form of association, it is advisable to encourage
them to best serve their clients' needs and to establish a legal
environment that is "conducive to international business and
investment and that supports deregulation and structural
reform.,

225

Thus, it is recommended that foreign lawyers be

allowed to "hire Japanese lawyers[] to provide advice on so-called
'third country' law (that is, the law of a country other than the one
that is a foreign lawyer's home jurisdiction) on the same basis as
Japanese lawyers, and to establish professional corporations,
limited liability partnerships (LLPs)[,] and limited liability
corporations. 226 It has been further recommended that "the
Nichibenren and the mandatory local bar associations provide
gaiben with effective opportunities to participate in the
development and enforcement of all laws and rules that affect
them., 227 "After more than 15 years of urging by the foreign legal
community, Japan enacted legislation in 2003 that substantially
eliminates restrictions on the freedom of association between
222 See Keneth S. Kilimnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice in a Global
Economy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269,

323 (1994);

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS (JAPAN) at 255-56, http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Document Library"
hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications" hyperlink; then follow "2004
USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2004 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow "Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2,
2007) [hereinafter 2004 NTE (JAPAN)].
223 Kilimnik, supra note 222, at 323.
224 See Burr, supra note 55, at 685.
225 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 351.
226 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (JAPAN)

at 221,

http://www.ustr.gov

(follow

"Document Library" hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications"
hyperlink; then follow "2003 USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2003
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow

"Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter 2003 NTE
227 Id.

(JAPAN)].
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foreign and Japanese lawyers, effectively permitting partnership
This was
and employment relationships between them., 228
followed by the new system of Joint Law Firms (Kyodo jigyo) in
2005 229
Many of the anti-competitive practices in the Japanese
accounting and legal services markets seem to be established and
operated to maintain domestic markets, especially when
considering the demands from Japanese and foreign multinational
enterprises on Japanese markets,23° which is similar to the situation
in Korea. There may, however, be specific instances when such
anti-competitive practices are affected by the cultural or social
circumstances peculiar to the two countries.
C. FinancialMarkets
"Japan's private insurance market is the second largest in the
world after that of the United States."23 ' The Japanese insurance
sector is regulated by the Financial Services Agency (FSA), which
was established in 1998.232 The FSA is in charge of all aspects of

financial regulation in Japan, including inspection, supervision and
surveillance of financial activities related to banking and securities
business in addition to insurance, the function of which is similar
to Korea's FSS, 233 which was established after the financial crisis
in 1997.234
As the Japanese government has pursued further deregulation
and liberalization in this sector, and despite noteworthy success, a
228 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 351.
229 Id. at 372.

230 The scarcity of qualified lawyers and accountants needed for M&A activities, for
example, has reportedly inhibited FDI to Japan. See 2004 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 222,
at 272.
231 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 368. The Japanese insurance market is
composed of private insurers, a large public sector provider of postal life insurance
products (kampo), the National Public Health Insurance System and a web of mutual aid
societies (kyosai). See id.
232 Kampo, the world's largest insurer, and Kyosai are excluded from regulation by
the FSA. See id. at 368-71. Because of this, they enjoy substantial competitive
advantages in Japan's insurance market. See id.
233 See supra Lee p. 123 and note 156, at 6 (describing the creation and powers of
the FSS).
234 See Lee, supra note 150, at 156.
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number of controversial issues have been raised by trade partner
countries. These include further liberalization and expansion of
the insurance market, as well as the introduction of new products
such as variable annuities and the possible expansion of sales of
such products by banks.235 Trade partner countries have required
the Japanese government to adopt the policy of increasing
competition as a basic principle of regulatory reform,2 36 and to
provide the foreign and domestic insurance industry meaningful
opportunities to comment and exchange views with Japanese
officials 237 regarding the development or revision of guidelines or
regulations. Such opportunities are provided through public
comment
procedures 238 and participation in government advisory
239
groups.

The FSA is required to shorten standard approval periods and
transition to a quicker, less burdensome file-and-use system for
certain insurance products. 40 Partner countries are also concerned
235 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE

at 306-07, http://www.ustr.gov (follow
"Document Library" hyperlink; then follow "USTR Reports and Publications"
hyperlink; then follow "2005 USTR Reports and Publications"; then follow "2005
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers" hyperlink; then follow
"Korea" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter 2005 NTE (JAPAN)].
236 For the motivations for deregulation in Japan from the 1980s to 1990s, from the
viewpoints of the trade partner countries, see Hiroko Yamane, Deregulation and
Competition Law Enforcement in Japan: Administratively Guided Competition?, 23
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (JAPAN),

WORLD COMPETITION 141, 142 (2000).
237 For the bureaucrats' use of the deliberate councils, (shingikai) to diminish
opportunities for open conflict in policy adjustments, see David Boling, Access to
Government-Held Information in Japan: Citizens' "Right to Know" Bows to the
Bureaucracy, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1998); Ken Duck, Now That The Fog Has
Lifted: The Impact Of Japan's Administrative Procedures Law On The Regulation Of
Industry And Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1686, 1699-1700 (1996).
238 Japan adopted its first government-wide public comment procedures in 1999 to
solve the problem that even though public policy and regulations are made by and
instituted through constant interaction with the private sector, few opportunities exist for
interested parties having no special access to the authorities or related councils to have
any input into the legislative process. See 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 348.
However, the effectiveness of the regulations is uncertain. See 2004 NTE (JAPAN), supra
note 222, at 254.
239 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 348.
240 In Japan, for example, life insurance is regulated through control of rate
estimation factors, which restrict effective price competition among insurance
companies. See Eun Sup Lee, Efficient Regulation of the Insurance Industry to Cope
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about the policyholder protection corporations, 241 which are
mandatory policyholder protection systems created by Japan in
1998 to provide capital and management support to insolvent
insurers. 42 Despite their strong and stable presence in the
Japanese insurance market, foreign insurers continue to have
serious concerns about the transparency and fairness of the
funding framework.
These concerns and practices raised by trade partner countries
as trade barriers to Japanese financial markets are similar to those
of Korea. In part, they are evaluated as trade barriers operated
intentionally to protect domestic markets. However, substantial
parts of the practice are seemingly rooted in consumer-protection
or market-stability oriented policies,243 which would be difficult to
evaluate under the current GATS system.
D. Investment Markets
Although most direct legal restrictions on FDI have been
eliminated, bureaucratic obstacles remain. These include the
occasional discriminatory use of bureaucratic discretion, 2"
particularly through the use of administrative guidance.245 While
Japan's foreign exchange laws currently require only ex post
notification of planned investment in most cases, a number of
sectors (e.g., agriculture, mining, forestry, and fisheries), which
have traditionally been the national strategic industries in Japan,
still require prior notification to government ministries.24 More

with Global Trends of Deregulationand Liberalizations, 13 BOND L. REV. 46, 59 (2001).

Korea maintains a similar practice. See id. In the United States, life insurance is
regulated through indirect rate controls. See id.
241 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 371.
242 See id.

243 For a description of the regulatory objectives of consumer protection in Japanese
financial services compared with the United Kingdom, see Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The
Regulatory Efficiency of a Single Regulation in Financial Services: Analysis of the UK

and Japan,22 BFLR-CAN 23, 55-56, 68-69 (2006).
244 For the ability to address these types of barriers in Japan through WTO
procedures, see Southwick, supra note 23, at 924-25.
245 For the increasing effectiveness of administrative guidance in Japanese industrial
policy, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE INPOSTWAR JAPAN 169 (1987).
246 2003 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 226, at 221.
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than government-related obstacles,2 47 however, Japan's low level
of inward FDI flows 24 8 reflect the impact25 °of exclusionary business
practices2 49 and high market entry costs.
Difficulty in acquiring existing Japanese firms, as well as
doubts about whether such firms, once acquired, can continue
normal business patterns with other Japanese companies,25 ' makes
investment access through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) more
difficult in Japan than in other countries. 2 The lack of financial
transparency and disclosure as well as differing management
techniques
have been cited as obstacles to M&A activity in
253
Japan.
Although there has traditionally been "antipathy toward FDI,
Japanese attitudes toward inward investment have become
positive, and some progress has been made through the
introduction of consolidated taxation and revised bankruptcy
procedures that make it easier for corporations and their assets to
be acquired or merged in a 'rescue' format., 254 Furthermore:
Japan has enacted new and revised legislation providing
opportunities for foreign investors. For example, the Industrial
Revitalization Law provides existing firms undergoing
reorganization (both domestic and joint-venture) with tax and
credit relief once the Japanese government approves the firm's
business restructuring plan. A new bankruptcy law (the Civil
Reconstruction Law) 255 also may provide investment
247 See Lee, supra note 87, at

187-92.

2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 372 ("Despite being the world's second
largest economy, Japan continues to have the lowest inward FD1 as a proportion of total
output of any major OECD nation.").
249 See Southwick, supra note 23, at 974-75.
248

250 See id. at 956 (discussing the private anti-competitive practices that could
undermine the benefits of regulatory reform in Japan).
251 For the key reasons for the persistence of anti-competitive business practices in
Japan resulting in these doubts from the viewpoint of Japan's competition policy and
regulation, see 2006 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 199, at 346-47.
252 Id. at 372-73.
253

2006 NTE

254

Id. at 373.

(JAPAN),

supra note 199, at 372-73.

See NISHIMURA & PARTNERS, CIVIL RECONSTRUCTION LAW (MINJISAISEIHO) -THE
FIRST DIP TYPE BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (2001),
http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/topic/2001/t020.shtml (describing the process and operation
255
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opportunities as it encourages business reorganization, including
spin-offs, rather than the forced liquidation of assets. Other
legislative changes now provide for stock options for
employees, a key issue for foreign firms wishing to attract high
quality employees. In addition, Japan has prepared legislation
on corporate divestiture that will facilitate a company's
streamlining efforts. New accounting rules are bringing Japan
close to the international standard and to a degree have helped
reduce extensive cross-shareholding among firms, as the new
accounting rules identify non-performing asset and liabilities.256
The practices and barriers to Japanese investment as cited above
are not in step with Japanese economic development, which might
be due to the government's traditional policy of protecting the
domestic market. Some legal or administrative barriers could be
eliminated or easily reduced under the current regulatory or
deregulation reforms if they were enforced.25 7 However, some
barriers reflecting Japanese exclusionary business practices or
social backgrounds cannot be removed so easily. 2 51 8 Particularly,
the practices reflecting the Japanese exclusionary business
atmosphere seem unique, which are substantially different from
those of Korea. 2 9 Additionally, many of those practices are
difficult to evaluate with regard to the multilateral norms included
in the WTO Agreements without transparent investment
regulations. 60
V. Review
The above analysis demonstrates that trade barriers in the
service markets of Korea and Japan have almost identical
characteristics, scope, and effectiveness, even though there are
differences in the degree of the criticism against those barriers

of the new law). The law is the first real debtor-in-possession type bankruptcy procedure
in Japan. See id. The Civil Reconstruction Law (Minjisaiseiho)became effective in
April 2000. Id.
256 2003 NTE (JAPAN), supra note 226, at 221-22.
257
258

See Yamane, supra note 236, at 142.
See Lee, supra note 87, at 194-95.

259 See id. (comparing Japanese exclusionary business practices with Korean antiimport biased atmosphere).
260 See Southwick, supra note 23, at 925.
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from their trading partner countries.26 ' This may be indicative of

each market's economic value to their partners' foreign markets.
For example, anti-competitive practices indicated by the Japanese
trade partner countries in the Japanese service markets, including
the banking and insurance sector, are very similar to those in the
Korean service markets.262
These practices reflect the policy objectives of both
governments to emphasize consumer protection and the stability of
financial institutions rather than fostering competition or operative
efficiency, which is somewhat different from developed western
countries.26 3 Such policy objectives reflect the overall social and

cultural environments of the two countries, emphasizing the
stability rather than the productivity or the efficiency of any
institution.
This result seems distinct from the conclusion that the author
made with respect to the two countries' commodity markets.264
That study revealed substantial differences between the anticompetitive practices of the two countries' markets; that is, some
Japanese exclusive business practices in commodity markets were
determined to be rooted in the intrinsic Japanese social
atmosphere, which might not be controlled easily by government
policy and is different from that of Korea.265 Substantial parts of

261 See id. at 927-28 (describing the basic difference in the practices of a few
sectors, including distribution industry, in Korea and Japan).
262 See Lee, supra note 150, at 160.
263 See generally Robert C. Eager & C. F. Muckenfuss, FederalPreemption and the
Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21
(2004) (discussing the effects of federal regulatory preemption on the federal-state dual
banking system); Yokoi-Arai, supra note 243, at 23-76 (discussing the reforms and
shortfalls of the Japanese regulatory scheme); Anna Jackson Holly, Comment, The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Protection Of Consumers or Excuse to Avoid Discovery?, 36
CUMB. L. REv. 615 (2005-2006) (describing the effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
on financial service competition and consumer protection).
264 See generally Lee, supra note 87, at 177-208 (analyzing the anti-competitive
practices of the two countries dividing into those in domestic markets and those between
frontiers).
265 See id. at 194-95 ("[the anti-import biased social atmosphere in Korea and the
-exclusionary business practices in Japan] seem somewhat different from the viewpoint
that the former atmosphere could be very temporary and extremely vulnerable to changes
in the overall social atmosphere or consumption attitudes in Korea, while the latter
practices might take time to change because they are the products of the long-standing
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service and investment barriers in Japan, which are particularly
related to the private markets without policy consideration, may
also originate from those exclusionary business practices intrinsic
to Japanese markets.2 66

Considering the overall economic situations of the two
countries, including the level of development of the service and
commodity markets, this result-though different from the
commodity and investment markets-implies that the service
markets are deeply affected by cultural factors as well. As viewed
by international standards, the two countries' cultural backgrounds
are almost the same, which makes their governments' policy
objectives for service market regulations very similar.2 67

For example, from the viewpoint of the partner countries, the
Japanese excuse for preventing foreign lawyers from participating
in any type of litigation is that it is necessary to prevent Japan
from becoming a litigious society,268 which seems to be the same
rationale given in Korea.2 69 This rationale may seem ridiculous or
unreasonable from the market viewpoint or profit-centered
approach adopted by western countries.
In both countries,
however, people have traditionally been very reluctant to stand up
in court, which has sometimes been seen as a shortcut to
individual bankruptcy, particularly in civil cases. Indeed, Koreans
and Japanese very often deliberately assume economic losses
instead of bettering their situation through legal action in court.
Considering the cultural and social atmosphere of the two
countries, the governments are apt to be persuaded to protect their
legal cultures from western countries. There are many other
situations in both countries' service markets which reflect their
particular cultural circumstances.27 °

commercial practices of the business society in Japan.").
266 See Southwick, supra note 23, at 955-56 n.91.
267 See Flores, supra note 130, at 167 (stating the cultural concerns which perhaps
prompt countries to limit foreign lawyers' scope of practice).
268 See, e.g., id. at 163 (noting the goal of "preserving the integrity of the local legal
profession").
269 Lee, supra note 150, at 161.

270 See generally Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean
Dispute Settlement (With Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1
(2005) (discussing the impact of cultural difference in settled resolutions).
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No cultural exceptions or provisions per se emerge from the
text of GATS. This is in contrast to the case of GATT, where,
even though it is far from being sufficient to deal with the cultural
aspects of trade, there are a few culture-related provisions.271
In the WTO rule-based context, disagreement on cultural
factors influencing trade in services makes the regulation of
service trade by GATS inefficient and controversial among the
member countries with different cultural and social
backgrounds.272 Complementary provisions reflecting the cultural
differences among the member countries might effectively be
incorporated into GATS. Until such complementary provisions
are made, the governments of Japan and Korea should try to
establish scientific and concrete evidence to support those
practices that reflect their particular cultural-social environments.
Such evidence could demonstrate the reasonableness and fairness
of those factors to international trade, as well as the necessity of
sustaining specific public policy objectives, or the inevitable
reflection of the particular situation intrinsic to their countries.
At the same time, it is advisable to establish interpretation
rules of the WTO Agreement that fully take into account the
cultural and social environments unique to the member
countries.273

These new rules would hopefully consider the

individual countries' specific situations regarding the cultural,
social, political, and historical backgrounds and atmospheres.
The implementation of such rules might be seen as
contradictory to the spirit embodied in recent international trade
regulations toward hard laws, as in the case of the WTO regime
from GATT.274 For the practical and efficient formation of
GAIT's cultural exclusions include Article XX(f) (protection of national
treasures of artistic value), Article XIX (emergency action on imports of particular
products) and Article IV (special provisions to cinematograph films). These exclusions,
however, are not sufficient to consider the specific cultural/social backgrounds of
circumstances of the individual member countries. See GATT 1994, supra note 114, art.
IV, XIX, & XX(f).
272 See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 60, at 291-304.
273 For the lack of specificity regarding cultural products within international trade,
see Karsie A. Kish, Protectionismto Promote Culture: South Korea and Japan,A Case
Study, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 161-62 (2001).
274 "Hard law refers to a system of norms as to which a relatively high expectation
of compliance exists." Abbott, supra note 9, at 196.
271
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international trade and competition regulations, however, their
uniform enforceability should properly be mixed with
flexibility. 275 Such flexibility should be complemented with the
adoption of strict rules of evidence. Even though it might be very
difficult and complicated to sufficiently evaluate the anticompetitive practices in the service markets and anti-competitive
TRIMs in terms of cultural and social factors as well as economic
and political factors, such an undertaking is desirable in order to
continue to promote international trade in services without serious
cultural contradiction among the member countries under the
WTO system.
Along with the incorporation of the aforementioned provisions
into GATS, it is also advisable to improve the current WTO
dispute settlement mechanism. One approach to improving the
current dispute settlement mechanism is to establish an
independent GATS dispute settlement body including a panel and
an appellate body. 276 The panel and the appellate body would
consist of permanent members who possess specific qualifications
to deal with the cultural, social, economic, and political aspects of
the disputes. These members would be appointed by the WTO
through open competition procedures.277
Hence, the GATS dispute settlement framework would operate
like a well-established international court. It would consist of a
275

It has been suggested:

[flor example, in the case of the TBT Agreement, taking into account the
existence of legitimate divergences of geographical and other factors between
countries the Agreement extends to the members the regulatory flexibility to
reflect the differences between them. There, the degree of flexibility is limited
by the requirement that technical regulations should not become unnecessary
obstacles to trade ....These provisions extending flexibility to the application
of the TBT Agreement could be expanded and applied more generally to the
construction of the WTO Agreement concerned.
Lee, supra note 87, at 207 n.223.
276 See Lee, supra note 127, at 163.
277
If constituted this way, the panel of GATS dispute settlement body would also
make United States' Section 301 "usable only at very high cost" as indicated by Alan
Wm.Wolff. See Wolff, supra note 32, at 1025-27 (stating "The failure of WTO dispute
settlement has made Section 301 ...usable only at very high cost ....The WTO has no
ability to investigate. There are no adequate safeguards to screen out bias in staff ....
The panel itself is likely to consist of busy disputes with other, more pressing,
responsibilities.").
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two-tier mechanism with reliable authority, which could provide a
more predictable legal environment in coordinated international
service markets.2 78 The establishment of such an independent
GATS dispute settlement body would also help to establish a clear
construction of rules related to the provisions of the current WTO
Agreements, which take into sufficient consideration the unique
situations of the individual countries. Such a dispute settlement
body would be an improvement upon the current dispute
settlement mechanisms under GATS, which were established
without sufficient consideration of the cultural aspects of trade in
services.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Many of the competition and trade-related laws in Japan and
Korea, particularly in the service and investment markets, have
been enacted and modified passively due to the expressed or
implied pressure from their trade partner countries and the
requirements of international organizations like the WTO and
OECD. Trade pressure on both countries in the service and
investment fields was particularly serious from the 1980s to the
1990s, during which time both countries took various measures to
open

and

liberalize

their service

markets.27 9

Thus,

such

modifications were not a voluntary response by the governments
to internal public and private sector concerns.
The modifications seem to have occurred in this manner
because the two countries' rapid economic growth and
development during the past forty years was influenced by their
governments' strong export-driven policies (which were not
balanced with the corresponding competition regulations) and
their heavy dependence on foreign trade. However, under the
WTO mechanism, both countries' competition and foreign trade
regulations should be improved voluntarily in accordance with the
liberalized global service and investment market systems.
Subsequently, the countries could pursue their trade policy

278 For the other soft approach through the non-binding panel to treat the disputes
raised from competition policy, see Kearns, supra note 8, at 313.
279 For detailed discussion on the trade friction between Korea and the United States
in the field of service industry as well as the commodity field, see Lee, supra note 91, at
155-59.
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objectives.
Competition policies or anti-competitive practices such as
trade barriers, particularly in the service and investment markets,
are substantially affected by the historical, political, cultural, and
social environments of the individual countries. This makes it
difficult to evaluate competition policy under uniform standards of
international norms as well as to produce internationally accepted
uniform norms to regulate competition-related matters. The fact
that the anti-competitive practices of both countries have been
comparatively reviewed via international trade norms that have
only been discussed, but not yet established, and without
consideration of other external factors, limits the research
possibilites.
This paper is expected to be followed by an interdisciplinary
analysis of the anti-competitive business practices of the two
countries to discover effective and cooperative policy directions
for solving the trade and competition-related problems. Such an
analysis may also suggest a direction towards more effective
regulation of trade in services in the coming WTO negotiation
rounds.
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